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We give a simple proof that it is impossible to guarantee the classicality of inputs into any
mistrustful quantum cryptographic protocol. The argument illuminates the impossibility of uncon-
ditionally secure quantum implementations of essentially classical tasks such as bit commitment
with a certified classical committed bit, classical oblivious transfer, and secure classical multi-party
computations of secret classical data. It applies to both non-relativistic and relativistic protocols.
INTRODUCTION
Wiesner’s pioneering work in quantum cryptography [1], and the ensuing discoveries by Bennett and Brassard of
secure quantum key distribution [2] and by Ekert of entanglement-based quantum key distribution [3], created much
interest in the possibility of secure quantum implementations of other cryptographic tasks. In particular, there has
recently been a great deal of interest in exploring quantum implementations of cryptographic tasks involving mutually
mistrustful (sometimes also called distrustful) parties. This interest was heightened by the growing realisation that,
by combining quantum protocols with relativistic signalling constraints, quite a wide variety of tasks in mistrustful
cryptography can be implemented with unconditional security. Early examples include relativistic bit commitment
protocols [4, 5] that are provably secure [5] against all classical attacks and against Mayers-Lo-Chau quantum attacks
[34–36]. Other examples include the BHK quantum key distribution protocol based on no-signalling ([6] ; see also
Ref. [7] for some further details and discussion) and later protocols significantly developing the idea [8–17], protocols
for an interesting novel cryptographic task, variable bias coin tossing [18], randomness expansion protocols ([19], with
a more complete presentation in [21]; [20]) using untrusted devices, together with partial security results, and recent
work on quantum tagging (also called quantum position authentication) [22–28] and other forms of position-based
quantum cryptography.
A very recent example, particularly relevant to the discussion of this paper, is a simple new provably unconditionally
secure protocol for bit commitment [29] via securely transmitted qudits, which makes essential use of relativistic no-
signalling constraints and of the properties of quantum information, in particular the no-summoning theorem ([30];
see also [31] for another cryptographic application).
Mistrustful classical cryptography is relatively well understood. The relations between various important classical
cryptographic primitives — for example, coin tossing, bit commitment, the various equivalent versions of oblivi-
ous transfer and secure multi-party computation — have mostly been established, along with some results on the
composability of these primitives.
There was initially some optimism that mistrustful quantum cryptography could be understood as a straightforward
generalisation of mistrustful classical cryptography. On this view, the role of the quantum cryptologist would be to
investigate the possibility of secure quantum protocols which implement precisely the known classical primitives, with
precisely the same composability properties. However this ambition was arguably always misguided (see e.g. Ref.
[32] for an early discussion) and was soon frustrated. As we discuss below, the problem is that requiring a quantum
protocol for a task to be unconditionally secure is generally logically inconsistent with ideal classical cryptographic
models for that task. In particular the superposition principle and the unitarity of quantum evolution are generally
inconsistent with classically motivated definitions.
Classical certification
The introduction of relativistic protocols adds another layer of complexity to questions about what can and cannot
be achieved by physics-based cryptography. As already mentioned, there are tasks for which one can prove that there
are no unconditionally secure non-relativistic protocols, but there are provably unconditionally secure relativistic
protocols. As the history of non-relativistic quantum cryptology already contains quite a few refuted conjectures and
subtle clarifications, it is perhaps no surprise that some rather basic questions about the possible scope of mistrustful
physics-based cryptography remain a source of some confusion to this day.
2This paper addresses one key point: the question of whether classical certification is possible. That is: can a
cryptographic protocol guarantee, based on physical principles alone, to all the other parties that one party, Alice, is
restricted so that (in order to avoid being detected cheating) her quantum inputs must take the form of pure states
that are elements of a public fixed basis {|i〉}di=1 of the appropriate d-dimensional input space HI? If there is such a
guarantee, Alice is effectively required to input classical information, since her input states can be faithfully copied
arbitrarily many times, either by her or any recipient, simply by measuring in the fixed basis and making copies of
the outcome states. In other words, the protocol effectively certifies to the other parties that Alice is inputting only
classical information. If not, Alice is free to input not only superpositions
∑
i ai|i〉 of basis elements but also states
in HI that are entangled with other systems HA that she may use elsewhere in the protocol, by creating states of the
form
∑
i ai|i〉A|i〉I . In other words, Alice is free to input any quantum states lying in the appropriate input spaces.
Classical classification would certainly be desirable in many contexts: by taking these intrinsically quantum options
away from Alice one could ensure that the quantum protocol precisely replicates a known classical task. However,
we give here a simple argument to show that classical certification cannot be guaranteed by quantum protocols for
mistrustful cryptographic tasks. This argument applies both to non-relativistic protocols and to protocols using
relativistic signalling constraints. It is simpler than and supersedes an earlier argument applying to the particular
case of bit commitment [33].
A MODEL OF MISTRUSTFUL RELATIVISTIC QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
We model mistrustful quantum protocols in Minkowksi space as follows. The protocol involves a number n ≥ 2 of
participating parties labelled A,B, . . .. Each party has a finite number of agents (A1, . . . , AnA and so on) in secure
laboratories; they trust everything inside their laboratories and that all their operations within the laboratories are
secure against eavedropping, but nothing outside the laboratories. The representatives are linked by secure quantum
channels, which we can take to lie within the laboratories.[37]
We describe the protocol from the perspective of one party, say Alice, represented collectively by A1, . . . , AnA .
During the protocol the Ai control space-time regions R1, . . . , RnA that may be disconnected from one another but
that are, we assume, each connected. The protocol defines all the actions that the Ai collectively should carry out,
assuming Alice wishes to follow it honestly. This includes the generation and distribution of any inputs private to
Alice, and any entangled states required for any purpose (communication, correlated inputs, . . .). This applies whether
these inputs and entangled states need to be generated before data is exchanged with other parties, or during the data
exchange phase. The protocol fixes points Pj within Ri at which input states, (which without loss of generality we
take to be qubits |ψj〉), are generated from private data and prescribes how they are then propagated and processed.
The protocol may also require Ai at one or more points to choose at random an input state from a list |ψ1〉, . . . , |ψn〉;
if so, it stipulates the relevant probabilities p1, . . . , pn.
For any given spacelike section of Ri, the protocol stipulates a set of points in space-time on the boundary of Ri at
which Ai must be prepared to receive quantum states, another set from which she must be prepared to send quantum
states, and a quantum network (which she may be required to alter over time) within Ri linking these sets.
The protocol is supposed to be unconditionally secure – i.e. to have security based on the known laws of physics
rather than any assumed technological constraints. In analysing the constraints on A we thus need to assume that
each Ai has effectively unbounded quantum technology. In particular, she can carry out quantum computations of
arbitrary complexity effectively instantaneously, send quantum states at light speed along error-free channels within
the regions she controls, and store arbitrarily large amounts of quantum information.
The stage at which the protocol terminates may be pre-determined or may be determined by collective computations
carried out within the protocol. In any case, we assume it must terminate after a finite number of inputs, but we do
not assume there is any pre-determined bound on this number.[38]
The protocol may include security tests, which (without loss of generality) we assume are defined by binary projective
quantum measurements to be carried out by parties after the rest of the protocol is complete.[39] These produce
outputs, 1 (“pass”) or 0 (“fail”). We require that the protocol is perfectly feasible: if all parties are honest, then it
will run to completion. We also require that it is perfectly reliable: if all parties honestly follow the protocol, then all
security tests always produce the outcome “pass”.
Formally, then, the protocol prescribes for each party quantum algorithms to be run over prescribed quantum
networks at each site, with prescribed input and output channels and timings, together with prescribed initial input
data or random choices, which may be predistributed via correlated states representing any required replication,
either at the same site or at separated sites. (For example, a|0〉A1 |0〉A1 |0〉A2 . . . |0〉ANA + b|1〉A1 |1〉A1 |1〉A2 . . . |1〉ANA
3represents a random input bit, with p(0) = |a|2, replicated so that two input copies are available at A1 and one at all
other sites.)
CLASSICAL CERTIFICATION IS IMPOSSIBLE
Suppose now that we have a protocol which guarantees classical certification for Alice’s inputs. Consider a single
classically certified bit input into a protocol by Ai. Without loss of generality we suppose the protocol allows either
classical bit value as input (otherwise the input is trivial). If Ai chooses to input the state |0〉, representing the
classical bit 0, she prepares |0〉 and inserts it at the appropriate point into her quantum network. Similarly, to input
|1〉, representing the classical bit 1, she prepares and inserts |1〉.
Now suppose that she chooses instead to prepare the state a|0〉 + b|1〉. By assumption, the probability of any
security measurement P producing outcome “fail” is zero in the first two cases. Hence, by linearity, the probability
of “fail” is zero in the third case. This contradicts the assumption that the protocol guaranteed classical certification
of the bit.
Similarly, if the protocol requires Ai to a input a state chosen from the ensemble {|ψi〉; pi}, she can instead prepare
a state of the form
∑
i p
1/2
i |i〉AS |ψi〉I , where the |i〉AS form an orthonormal basis of an ancillary system that she
stores, and then input the I system. Since no measurement can distinguish between proper and improper mixtures
represented by the same density matrix, and the probability of any security test producing “fail” is zero if Alice follows
the protocol faithfully, it must also be zero if she deviates in this way.
Obviously, these arguments extend immediately to inputs of states of arbitrary finite dimension. Classical certifi-
cation of Alice’s inputs (whether defined by private data or randomly chosen) is thus impossible, as claimed.
WHY CLASSICAL CERTIFICATION CANNOT GENERALLY BE ENFORCED BY MEASUREMENT
One might possibly be tempted to think that (without contradicting the above proof) a property operationally
equivalent to classical certification can easily be guaranteed, since even if one party inputs a superposition of bits
into a protocol, any other party can collapse the superposition by carrying out a measurement on the input in the
computational basis.
This is generally incorrect. In general, the parties input bits into their own quantum computers, which process
the quantum data, along with data received earlier in the protocol, before sending appropriate subsets to another
party or parties. Consider a single input qubit, and two possible orthogonal input states, |0〉 and |1〉. Although the
corresponding output states must be orthogonal, the reduced density matrices for the corresponding states sent on to
the other parties, ρ0 and ρ1, need not necessarily be. Also, whether or not they are orthogonal, the receiving party
may not necessarily know the measurement basis which (perfectly or optimally) distinguishes them.
DISCUSSION
We have given a simple general argument against the possibility of physically guaranteed certificates of classicality
for mistrustful cryptographic protocols. This addresses a point which seems to have caused some confusion. If we were
to require that mistrustful quantum protocols should follow ideal classical definitions precisely, as has sometimes been
suggested in the literature, then in particular we would have to require mistrustful quantum protocols to guarantee
classical certification of their inputs, and this would either trivialise or exclude many of the most interesting questions
in mistrustful quantum cryptology.
For example, if we were to require – as a matter of definition – that any quantum bit commitment protocol must
guarantee classical certification of the committed bit, we would not need Mayers’ and Lo-Chau’s celebrated and
elegant demonstrations [35, 36] of the impossibility of non-relativistic quantum bit commitment: the one-line proof
given in this paper would suffice.
We hope this small clarification will help focus attention on attainable quantum cryptographic security criteria.
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